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lntroduction
Inteïnational Sports Federations (IFs) govern global spott. There are more than 100 IFs
(members of the Cloba1 Association of lnternational Sports Feclei'ations [CAISF])' of which
approximately 60 have their heaciquarters in Switzerland, IFs range from the powerful FIFA
1Ëe.1er"tion Internationale de Football Association) which has been based in Zurich since 1932,
to the International'Wusiru Federation (IWU$, which recently estabiished its headquarters in
Lausanne to govern the Chinese martial art also known as Kung Fu. IFs act as umbrella organisa-
tions for the natiolal feclerations oftheir sport; in turn, national federations ancl state feclerations
oversee c1ubs. IFs establish ancl conffol global rules, award championships to cities and countries,
negotiate with sponsors ancl broaclcasters and ûght the excesses ofsport such as cloping and cor-
rr:f,tion.They are usuah associations of associations and, frorn this point of view their govern-
,n.. d.r..u., to be studiecl separately frorn that of sports associatiotls that comprise individuals,
such as the Ioc (Inrernational olympic comrnittee) or ciubs (chappelet, 201'6a).
IFs work with private arrd public actors that have einbraced organisational (or corporate)
governance and political (or democratic) governance since the 1990s ancf increasingly, require
that their sport pâïtl1ers be governed appropriately within the scope of a systemic governarlce
that involves a1i actors (private, public ancl nonprofit tlird partie$ in the sport (Henry & Lee,
2004).Maoy IFs are over a century old,but their governance - which is obliged to take up a
position straddling corporate anci political governânce - has evolved little since the Belle Époque,
whereas the challenges in terms of cornmercial issues and sports regulation have become much
more complex (Chappelet, 201S).At the turn of the century, several IFs experienced problems
that can be described as problems ofgovernance (i.e., failings concerning transpârency, account-
ability, clenrocracy, integrity and the control ofdecision-rnaking by stakeholders)'
TLe IOC, which governs the Olyrnpic Games in conjunction with a wide range of part-
ners (mainly organising commirtees of the oiympic Games lococs], National olympic
Committees INOC3] a1d International Sports Feclerations [IFs]), itself experiencecl governâllce
problems in iSSg-tqSq lconcerning the awarcl of the Olympic Games]).These issues obliged
tt . tOC to ernbark on significant reforms, such as introdticing term limits for IOC members
(maximum 8 + 4), reducing rhe age linit of its active mernbers (from 80 to 70) ancl publishing
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detailed financial âccounts (wenn, Barney &. Mattyn,2O11). Subsequenr to what beca're known
as the sait Lake city scandal (because it initialty involved ihrt .iryt bid comnrittee for the 2002'Vrinter Games), other scandais that received less media coverâge 
"ff.ct.d several lFs.These led tocertain reforms of governauce and the resignation of the presidents, who were also loc mem-bers, of some IFs including the FIVB (vofleyball), r3r (udo) and.wrF (taekwondo).
Two of the largest IFs * FIFA for football and IAAF for athletics : experienced so-calied
"governance scandals" in 2015, wlich involved their respective fornrer presidents. Followingthese scandals, in Decembe r 20r5,the Ioc asked the ASOIF to set up a working group on thegovernance of sport' This working group was established to stucly tL. irr.r. i1 respect of IFs,
while recognising their independence and autononry and specifiing that it woulci concluct ân
audit of its main subsidies ro IFs (and arso to Nocs ana oôocs; [oc, zorsl. More recenriy,the IoC (2018) called for reforms of the governance of rhe trFs overseeing boxing (AIBA) a'dbiathlon (IBLf fotlowing the resignation of these IFs'presidents ,r rt 
" 
,.*tt of scandals.This chapter focuses on the governance of IFs. It examines howASoIF dealt with rhe IoC,s
request and what overall results were achieved (section 1).Tire chapter then takes a closer look
at the governance of a 
.lpeciûc IF overseeing a major sport, narn^ely cycJing and the unio'cycliste Internationale (ucl) (Section 2).The ucl has had fou, p..rijer.ts since rhe srarr ofthe 21st century'These changes in the presiclency marked evolutions in the ucl,s governance
since 2000' Going beyond respect-for the general principles ofgovernance, secrion 3 emphasisesthe inportance to governance of the leadership of anb'and"the relationship between the IF
and the national federations. In conclusion, it is reiterated that the governance ofan I! beyonclits own (organisationai) govemance, must absolutely address issues"that arise lrom the poiiticalgovernance of its leaders ancl the systemic governânce of its nerwork.
The assessment of lF governance by ASOIF
In response to the Ioc's request (Ioc,2015),ASOIF set up a working group know'as theGovernanceTask Force (GTF).This task force, chaired by theASOIF jresident- the formerpresident of the ITF (International Tennis Fed.eration) 
- 
co'sisted of ihr.. IF represenrarives(FEI 
- 
equestrian sporr; FIBA 
- 
basketbali; arid FIVB * volleybail), an IOC nember (formerPresident of FISA * rowing), the Ioc chief Ethics a,ra comptran.. ôm.", the FIBA LegarDirector, an external expert and an academic (one of the authàrs), assisrecl byASOIF staffand
an independent "moderator". (Inôrmation on the GTF and its activities is available at www.
asoif. c omlgovernance-task-force.)
The GTF rapidly 6ame up with a set of five major principles (transparency, iltegrity, democ-
racy, sport development and solidarity and conrrol ,rr"Àrrrirrrrs;, 
"a.1, -.rrur.d by ten indicators.This followed the example of the tool that had been proposecl a few years eariier by chappelet
:9-Y:l:qt: (2013) featuring Basic Indicators fo, setr., Gou.r,ra.rc. in Inrer.nario'al Sport(BIBGIS) (ASOIE 2016a).The council and GeneralAssembly ofASoIE (i.e., the associario'
of the 28 IFs that govern sporrs on the programme of the Summer orympic Games) (ASOIE2016ti), adopted these principles and indicarors in April 2016.
. 
Following this approval, a questionnair. *r, ,.rrt to all IF members ofASoIF Each ques_
ii:1 *t based on a pre-defined indicator.The IFs were asked if the indicators were either notfu]ûlled at a1i (in which case a score of 0 was allocated) or futûlled (in which case a score of 1to 4 was allocated depending on the degree of firlûlment of the indicator.The scores were 1 =partiaily firlfilled; 2 = fultlied; 3 = well fulfilled according to published rules,/procedures; 4 =totaliy fulfilled in a srate-oÊthe-art manner).The inciicator, ùr" rrot weighted (i.e., all were
considered equally important).
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A predefined scale ofscores between I and 4 was provided for each indicator/question and
the IF was asked to selÊassess. For example, for the question "Do you pubiish an annual 
âctivity
report and main event reports?", the responses *"re *"or"d in accordance with the 
qualiry of the
reports (ASoIE 201.6c):0 = No; t = Some news publishecl on IF **:i,:;2 = News published
."gutrrly a'd an annual report available on IF wetsite; 3 = News published regularly and sev-
eral years ofannual report;, eâsy to find on IF website;4 = Fuil publication, eâsy to ûnd 
on IF
website, with extra,lrtn or.*pinnation from past repofts (for comparison)'The score given for
eachindicatorl,adtobejustified(for"",n'ple,byawebsiteURLoranofficialdocument)anci
could be moclified by the GTF as IFs were sometimes too sevefe or generous with themselves
on the assessment of a speciflc indicator'
This scoring system al1ows both a quantitative evaluation (based on a score of 0 or ânother
value, i,e., no/yes) and a qualitative evaluation (a scor.e behveen 7 and 4 depending on the degree
of sophistication in achieving the igdicator).Thus, an age limit (aninficator not considered by the
GTF) for IF board rnembers of 80 years or more could cotrespond, for example, to a score of 1'
âgeuptoT5toascoreof2,ageuptoT0toascoreof3'ageof65orlesstoascoreof4'Noage
linrit would give an m , ,.ore"of 0 for this indicator'The scale chosen is important in determining
the governance requirement at a given time in history alrd in accordance with different cultures/
countries. For example, r., ,durrràd age is (was) more valued in Eastern than in'Western 
cultures'
Depenfing on the prevailing eth"os and standards of fairness, ân age restriction could be
consiclered 
", 
dis.ri*irr.tory, ilfiistrating the cultural and temporal relativity of an assessment of
governance.The lotion that "good go*rrrr.t.." cou1d permanently be "good", at any time' is a
norion unfortunately u.ry *ii.ly used by many âuthors' Flowever, GTF indicators do consti-
tute a "hard core" consicler..l to b. i-portrot for the bodies governing international sport (IFs)
regardless ofthe country/culture in which they operate'
The ûve dinrensions'(each with 10 inficator$ were coraplemented by a preliminary section
entitled,iGuiding Codes)'. It is composed of 10 questions on the degree to which the respond-
ing IF satisûed the main codes of the Olympic movement (Olympic Chatter' Code of Ethics'
WorldAnti.DopingCode,UniversaiBasicPrinciples,Agenda202.0',CodeonthePreventionof
the Manipulation of competitions) and national and international laws on sport'The 23ASOIF
rnember feclerations responcled to the questionnaire and the resul$ were published in April
201,7 attheASOIF GeoeralAssenrbly (ASOIR 20t7a) aîter the GTF had checkecl the answers
andevidenceprovided(mo"ltori"g;'theGuiclingCodessectiont:t":gouttobedifficultto
monitor as it was very subjectiv"; ih"r"for", it wa; not published'The IFs achieved a score for
each of the five dimensions. Al1 the indicator scores for each IF were sgmmated 
to give total
scores (ASoIF,2017a).Ttlts allowed tlre IFs to be ciassiûed into three groups: GroupA (8 IFs
with a total score between I22 and 170);group B (11 IFs with a total score of 91-113); group
C (9 IFs with â total score of 65-83)'The maximum score achievable was 200 and the avetage
was 100. It wâs noted that, âs often h"pp"n, with the introduction of an innovation 
(in this case
governance), the rargets atî".t"d (i' tùs càse the IFs) can be categorised into three groups:The
early adopters and iate adoptets : groop, tirat are numerically sirnilar and well above or below
the average respectively -inj^ rùg1ttly larger micldle-oÊthe-roacl group, scoring atound the
average.The ave.|ages.or" of the tFs for this ûrst review was 104 (out of a maximum of 200)'A
margin of error exists as in all measurements. In the end, it is not the absolute value of the 
scores
which mattered but the facr that each IF could position itseif in one of the groups and 
see how
it could be better governed. In other words, if the IFs were too lenient with themselves' 
it was
fooling nobodY but itself.
This monitored selÊassessment exercise.rvas repeated at the end of 2017 ancl publisired in
April 2018. However, this time 40 IFs were included * the 28 ASOIF mernbers plus its five
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observer members (the IFs of sports added to the programme of the Tokyo 2020 Olympic
Games in addition to rhe 2U ful1 Olympic sports), together with the seven IFs of the sports on
the'Winter Olympic Games programme.The questionnaire was almost the sâme âs in the first
exercise to allow year-on-year comparisons.There were only minor amendments of questions
that had been poorly drafted or were the subject ofdebate (depending on the IFs'understand-
ing) with the addition of general questions such as the IF's staffnumbers, turnover and registered
ofûce (ASOIE ZAI7b).The principle of ûve dimensions and ten indicators per dimension was
retained, as was the Guiding Codes section, although this was renamed "Background".
The results for the 33 IFs that are menrbers or observer members ofASOIF were published
in April 2018 at the ASOIF General Assembly (ASO$ 2018).This time the IFs were classiûed
into four groups:A1 (6 IFs with scores between 152 and I77);A2 (8 IFs with scores of 120-142);
B (10 IFs wirh scores from 96 to 1I2);C (9 IFs with scores of 46-89).These groups could be
described respectively as strông, quite strong, averâge and weak in relation to the governance
inclicators used by ASOIF. The results of the seven winter sports IFs governance were published
later by their association (AIOWf, 2018).
Compared ro the results of theASOIF 201.7 rcview theASOIF 2018 review showed an
improvement in the average score from 104 to 7}I.This suggests that, from one year to the
next, the 33 IFs that are mernbers or observer members ofASOIF have broadiy improved their
governânce, with observer menrbers (who want to remain on the Olympic progranmre after
Tokyo 2020) achieving particularly high scores. Furthermore, half of the IFs evaluated in20t7
increased their total score by 20 points or more.The second review of governance ofAIOVlrF
members for 2017-2078 showed some progress since the first edition (mean scores improved
from 93 to 109).
Each IF received irs score from these reviews with a view to highlighting where their own
governânce could be improved, FIowever, the IF individual scores were not pubiished as this
would inevitably have led to a classification of IFs which, according to the CTf; would be
nonsensical given the very diffetent sizes ofthe organisations (from over 500 to fewer than 10
employees).Two quesrions in the second questionnaire by theASOIF GTF on the IFs'staffsize
and turnover did illustrate â strong correlation between large size or turnover and a good gov-
ernânce score (ASOIE 2018).
Another system for measuring IF governance was published for the ûrst time in 2015 as a
resuit of tfie Action for Good Governance in International Sport (AGGIS) prqect funded by
the European Commission within the scope of the Erasmus* pro[Jfamme (Alm,2013).The
system, known as Sports Governance Observer (SGO), is based on à method similar to the GTF
and features four dimensions:Transparency and public comlrunication (12 indicators); demo-
cratic process (1 0 indicators) ; checks and balances (9 indicators); solidarity (7 indicators) , narnely
a total of 38 indicators for the current version of the SGO (Play the Game,2017).The SGO
study originally concerned 35 IFs of sports that feâture in the programmes of the Summer or
'Winter Olympic Games. Unfortunately, the report is no longer availabie on the Play the Garne
website (AGGIS consortium leader). It emphasised the overall need to irnprove IF governance
and highlighted glaring deficiencies, pârticularly in terms of the non-publication of ûnancial
reports or officials'renruneration and the absence of a iimit on the number of terms of ofûce
for IF presidents.The report produced a ranking of IFs, with FEI (equestrian) placed first and
FIFA (football) second, even though FIFA was in the niddle of a scandal concerning govern*
ance (Ingle,2015),
In 2018, the SGO study considered just five IFs: FIFA (footbail), FINA (swimming), IAAF
(athietics), IHF (handba1l) and ITF (tennis) (Geeraert,2018).These ûve IFs do not reflect the
diversity of the 40 organisations (33 if only those IFs governing sports on the programme ofthe
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Summer Games are considered).It is also not clear why some IFs were chosen and others were
not, irrespective of whether or not they were affected by governance scandsls' In addition' 
the
collection of the data necessàry ror the iots and 2018 SGo studies was largely conducted with-
out the collaboration of À. É, in question, Information was taken from the available websites
and did not benefit from commenm made by the parties involved'
'When the sports ministers of the Council of Èurope met in Budapest in November 2016'
the second resolurion of the rneeting encouragecl all IFs to use the principies ancl indicators,
developed by the ASOIF GTF as a ûIst step towarcls improving their governance 
(council of
Europe [CoE], 2016). InJanuary 2018, the-Parliâmentâry Assernbly of the Council of Europe,Àff"-i"L . ,Ëpor, by Assembly memberJensen (not available on the organisationk website)'
..t.ro*tlag"d the efforts ,n"à" by th" ÀSOtf GTF whiie 'raking t'r'o recommendations
(P4CE,2018,p.1)thatasetofindicatorsforthegovernanceoflFsshouldbecertiâed,for
example, by an orgauisation such as ISO (International Organisation fot Standardisation) (point
8 of Resoluti on 2199,2) that the spofts movement shoulcl establish an "independent sport eth-
ics rating system" similar to rating systems that exist in other areas such as environmenral 
issues
(point 12).
AsolFlaunchedaGovernanceSupportMorritoringl.Jnit(GSMU)inNovember20lB.This
comprised the same members as the CiF but without IF representatives; in this way being nrore
in.lependentoflFs.ThisnewunitisalsochairedbytheAsolFpresiderrtandistaskedwith
.rrryirrg out a further assessment of the governance of IFs, again based on the GTF question-
naire, for publication in 2020. Furth"r*or., the GSMU will assist IFs that want to improve their
g";.r"rrri" 
- 
in particular by means of quick wins that can be implemenred by IF management
îirhorr, decisions by the board or general assenrbly.The GSMU will also study the proportion
of IOC subsidies in IF budgets (orilinally requested by the IOC Executive Boarcl i' Decenrber
201,5 
-see above) and supiort risk assessment for IFs, an important dimension 
of governance'
Moreover, the GTF 
"*"*pt" is to be followecl 
by other IFs rather than just ASOIF or AIOWF
members. In November ZbtA, tt 
" 
approximateiy 50 IF members of the GAISE which are not
part o6ASOIF oTAIOWR 
"noourr."J 
their intention to use â reduced set ofASOIF GTF indi-
iators (about 20) to improve their governance'
It should be noted that the toô has gradually increased pressure on IFs lo practice better
governance. Evidence of this lies in the Novemb et 2018 decisions of the Ioc Executive Board
to continue monitoring the governance of the IWF (weightlifting), in particuiar with regard
to its anti-doping programrnJ ,od to open an investigation into the governance of the AIBA
ftoxing) *t i"n À,rra tead ro rhe ,"*ou"l of boxing from the olympic progfamme (IOC' 2018)
à"rpirJtn" efforts of this IF with its New Founclation Plan adopted in mid-2018 (AIBA' 20tB)'
Similar pïessures were exerted on the IBU ât the time that it was changing its president'The,
previous president was under investigation in his own countfy (Norway) and in the country of
the IBU's headquarters (Austria)'
As can be seen, the work on the governance of IFs is far from complete' even though there
has been significant progress.This is Àt just due to the GTF; there has also been an independent
move by some IFs since the turn of the century as is shown in the next section in relation to
theUCI(cyciing)(Section2),However,itwillaisobeshown(inSection3)thatmuchdepends
on the leadership of the IF president and the network of mernber ûationâl federations' 
in other
words it is not enough for an IF to sinrply "tick the boxes"' Stakeholders and observers should
be able to undertake a qualitative 
"rr"rrirr"rr, 
ofthe governance slyle ofIFs leaders which can-
nor be assessed only by indicators such as,shose used by the GTF and which woulcl take into
consideration the e{fectiveness ofboards in ensuring good governance and the achievement of
organisational objectives' 
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The governance of the UCI (Union Cycliste lnternationale)
The governance of IFs has become an all-consuming question not only in acadendc literature
but aiso in the rnainstream meclia. This re{iects concerns about the limits of IFs' autonomy âs
closed, self-regulating organisations at the head of an inter-organisational network. Enjoying
signiûcant legal freedonr despite their increasing commercialisation, IFs conrinue to function
as quasi*nouopolies (Forster,2006; Geeraert,2015).V/aning pubiic trust and the proliferation
of scandals involving governance raises the question of whether IFs are still capable of selÊ
regulation.The example of the UCI iilustrates the shift from a governance model centred on
the presiclent to one that is increasingly in{luenced by external pressures.The foilowing section
describes and analyses the evolution of the UCI's governânce rnodei from 1.991 to rhe present
day by examining four presidencies (HeinVerbruggen, Pat McQuaid, Brian Cookson and David
Lappartient) and the respective changes in governance that these presidents ordered,/initiated on
their own or were forced to implement.The data upon which this section is based comes from
personal observations, discussions ancl interviews conducted by one ofthe authors who used to
work at the UCI. Secondary sources are also used, such as the Regulations, Constitution and
Teports published on the UCI websire, as well as journal articles.
Hein Verbruggen (1 99î *2A05)
The presidency of HeinVerbruggen iaid the foundation of the UCI's governance model.This
period is characterised by three major, distinct issues, nameiy (1) the recognition of the UCI as the
sole governing body ofcycling, (2) control ofthe internationai cycling calendar and (3) corporate
leadership, HeinVerbruggen became UCI president in 7991. Before this, &on 7984 to 7991,he
was president of the Fédération Internationale du Cyclisnre ProGssionnel (FICP), one of cycling's
three governing bodies in that era. Since 1965, cycling had been governed by the UCI, the FICP
(riainly representing western capitalist countries) and the Fédération Internarionale Amateur de
Cyclisme (FIAC) (mainly representing communist countries).This separation had become conr-
pulsory when Avery Brundage, IOC president ftom 1,952 to 1,972,reinforced rhe amateur code in
1964,The arnâteur code excluded all athletes who had participated in sporting events for money
or rnaterial advantage from the Olympic Games.The IOC only recognised the FIAC, cycling!
amâteur federâtion. In an âttempt to ensure political balance, the UCI board wæ equally composed
of FICP and FIAC members. However, persistent political and ideological differences between
the FICP and the FIAC resulted in an unsurmountable impasse.This defacto deadock paralysed
the UCI for 27 years.Verbruggen's ûrst major official act was therefore to confer all powers to
the UCI. He achievegl this goai through the dissolution of both the FICP and the FIAC in 1992.
Two events faciiitated these dissolutions. Firsdy, the word amateur was renroved from the Olympic
Charter and, as of 1984, professional athletes couid participate in the Olyrnpic Games. Secondiy,
the demise of the USSR in 1989 simpliûed the fali of the Iron Currain in cycling.
Verbruggen was convinced that, in order to control and govern its sport, an IF had to take
charge ofits international calendar and sporting rules,The UCI rulebook was very thin at the time.
The actual regulatory power lay with race organisers, who established their own rules for their
races.Verbruggen "sau' very quickly that ASO1 was the master of the international cycling calen-
dar" (HeinVerbruggen, November 2014).ln fact, the internationa"l cycling calendar represented
â nleans to regulate and conttol race organisers, cycling teams and the sport itself and was also a
source of revenue.Verbruggen's main political and econonrjc challenge fu 1"991. was therefore to
wrest control of the international cycling calendar frorn the all-powerfirl race organisers.As the
UCI tried to take hold of the calendar, tensions with the û1ost powerful race organisers increased,
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especially with the ASO,The launch of the ProTour in 2005, a UCl-owned circuit, marked the
beginning of a power struggle between the UCI and ASO, which was to last until 2008 and
required the intervention of the IOC as a nr.ediator, In terms of the rules, the UCI set an exampie
to orher IFs and some even"revised their statutes in function of our statutes" (HeinVerbruggen,
November 201,4).For insrance, as early as 7992,the remuneration of board members in the fornr
of compensation for loss of earnings was openly introcluced into the UCI Constitution.
Unlike nrultinationals, the shareholders ofwhich seek a return on investment, IF members (i.e.,
continental confederations and national federations) generally lack common objectives, At ieast,
rhis was HeinVerbruggen's point of view:"It's like a basket full of frogs.They go in all directions.
t...] 150 or 200 members, all have their own interests and work against each other.You're not
going ro find optimal solutions with 200 people in a room" (HeinVerbruggen, November 2014).
Verbruggen tried to overcome the poiitical sclerosis of the UCI's system of governance by impos-
ing strong (autocratic) leadership. Applying the principles of management that he had learned
during his time at M&M/Mars (the confectionâry colrpâny, which was a major cycling sponsor),
Verbruggel wâs a pioneer with regard to the implementàtion of corporate flallagernent practices
in IFs.The president became aû executive president who, together with the 15 board nembers,
deterrnined the objectives ancl the stl?tegy of the UCLA smal1 group made up of the president,
director general and the legal and financial directors, took political decisipns.The director genetal
was in control of several departments (e.g., 1egai, ûnancial, event, marketing aûd sporti). One of
Verbruggen's main concerns was to ensure â clear separation of powers to avoid staff becoming
involved in politics and to prevent elected officials having an influence in day-to-day operations.
However,Verbruggen was said to be involved in both - and to have acted with an iron ûst.As the
UCI Constitutiorr had to be revised after the dissolution of tire FICP and FlAC,Verbruggen used
this opportunity to reduce the power of the continental conGderations, consiclering them a poiiti-
cal and financial burden and responsible for draining money from the IE, Continental confeclera-
tions were rnainly represented in their roie as voting delegates, Instead ofa one-nation-one-vote
sysrem, the UCI atloptecl a repïesentative democracy underVerbruggen.This system consisted of
42 voting delegates distributecl anlong the five continental confederations.This weighted system
of votes was supposed to re{ect the geographical representation of cycling worldwide aird was
therefore very Eurocenrric.The system is still in place today, as Article 36 of the UCI Constitl'1tion
testifies, although now consisting of 45 voting delegates (UCI,2018a).
HeinVerbruggen was much praised during his presidency for the UCI's growing prosper-
ity, improved structure and professionalisation. Ir.2004, the UCI wâs one of the ûrst ÏFs to
adopt Rules ofgovernance based on 11 principles: Identity, objectives, r.epresentation, decision-
making proces$, trânsparency, comrnunication, sport mânagement, roles, commercial activities'
ûnances a1d soliclarity (Chappelet & Mrkonjic,2013). HeinVerbruggen became an IOC rnem-
bet in 1996 in his,capacity as an IF president. However, a stting of aliegations againstVerbruggen
emerged from 2003.Atthough e report commissioned by the UCI and published in 2015 could
not establish clear proofofcorrupt behaviour,Verbruggen was accused ofprefetential treatlnent
in speciûc cases, âurocràtic ieadership ancl a lack of checks and balances during his tinre as UCI
president. He robustly clefended his achievements as UCI pre$ident and refuted these allegations
until his cleath inJr-rne 2017.
Pot McQuaid QA05*2013)
pat McQuaid's presidency represented somewhat of a continuity of Verbruggen's agencla.
According to former staff members, McQuaid often called Verbruççgen for advice, McQuaid
did not have the charisnra ofVerbruggen - nor his skills in politics, mânagenrent or visionary
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thinking. Nevertheless, his presidency is associated with two main achievements' Firstiy, the
creatio;of the CyclingAnti-Doping Foundation (CADF) in 2008 to manaf,e the UCI's anti-
doping programme (e.g., to detne and implement the UCI's doping control strategy and con-
duct in- and out-of-competition testing). Secondly, after a power struggle that started with the
anllouncement of the PioTour in2004,ASO and the UCI tnaliy came to an agreement in
2QQ8.Throughout McQuaid's presidency, the pervasive influence ofVerbruggen on the govern-
ance of cyclii'ng persisted. (Verbruggen was re-elected as an IOC member in 2006 in his capacity
os Ho.rorary ùôt p..sider.r; he was also a close friencl ofJacques Rogge, the IOC president at
the time.) McQuaid was defeâted by Brian Cookson in the 2013 presidential election after a
hard-fought campaign, cookson and his team did everything they could to discreditverbruggen
and Mc{uaid in order to present Cookson as the leader of a campaign to restore the UCI's
credibility and distance the new president from allegations against the UCI'
Freeburn (201,3),who examined the allegations against the UCI in the investigation into
doping concerning Lance Armstrong and the US Postal Service Pro CyclingTeam, argued that
,tt oùn pat Mceuaid was nor an instigator, he did maintain a defective structure of govern-
ânce that ultiraately resulted in nrany calls for the reform of the ucl.
Brian Cookson (201 3-2017)
Brian Cookson took over the UCI presidency ât a time when its credibiliry had suffered a con-
siderable blow as a result of the LanceArmstîong affair.This had severely discredited the UCI's
governance, Cookson's 2013 electoral manifesto had two priorities: An overhaul of cycling's
i'nti-doping policies and the development of women's cycling.The first aimed to come to terms
with the pr-rr 1i..., UCI anti-dopinj practices and aliegations of laxity regardingVerbruggen and
McQuai$ ând restore credibility lttotrbiy vis-à-vis the IOC and cycling's stakeholders)' The
objeJtive of th" ,..ond priority (the developnrent of women's cycling) was to create a forward-
loàking, progressive image for the UCL Soon after his eiection, Cookson established the Cycling
trrd.pÀJ"ni Reform Commission (CIRC), which published a damning 227-page report in
2015 accusingverbruggen and McQuaid of colluding with LanceAl'mstrong (Mackay,2015)'
Despite hii ambitio"t objectives and desire for governânce reform, Cookson's short presidency
was contested for various re,isons. He rvas accused by both staffand board members of being too
hesitant, of lacking the necessary ieadership ski11s and of deiegating too many responsibiiities to
his director general (Pavitt, 2016; Roan, 2017). Cookson further ignored the gtowing dissatisfac-
tion of the btard with the leadership iFrbalance thât arose from the director general's prominence
and Cooksol's abselce. FIe was oo, ,r, .*".,rrive president as his predecessors' Furtherrnore' after
just 1g months, the turnover of UCIstafi'had exceeded 50 percent (due to disnrissals and volun-
"tary 
departures) with no sirategy in place for knowledge transfer. Cookson suffered a humiliating
d"â"t to David Lappartient in t'he 2b17 presidential election (37 votes to 8)' He thus became the
ûrst UCI presiclent ro serve jusr one ter;. Despite Cooksont deGat and repeatecl criticism of his
ieadership, he and his team achieved many important governance reforms during the four years
of his mandate.Table 13.1 gives details of three of the five GTF dimensions.
David Lappartient (since September 2017)
While Brian Cookson's nrain challenge wâs to restore trust in the UCI's governance, which
he notably tackied by teforming anti-doping policies, govelnance was no longer a crttical
issue wlren David Lappartient was elected to the UCI presidency in September 2017 'Onthe
contrary, the UCI wâs even considered a model of governance in many respects'According to
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Table 13.1 The UCI's governance reforms under President Brian Cookson
Democracy
Transparency
lntegrity
A term limit (12 years) was introduced for the president in 201 6 - UCI
Constitution, Art. 62 (UCl, 2018a).
The presidenfs remuneration and the overall remuneration of all board members
have been disclosed in the UCI's financial report since 201 3'
A transparent bidding process for the award of maior cycling events was
introduced in 20152.
The ucl Ethics commission was completely revamped in 201 6. lt now has to be
composed of five members, including a minimum of one woman. As per Article
t Z oi the UCI Code of Ethics, the chair and two further members have to be
independent of the world of cycling. The secretariat of the Ethics Commission
is inàependent of the UCI administration (UCl Code of Ethics, Art. 1 3.'l). The
Ethics Commission can sanction behaviour (UCl, 201 8b)'
Until 201 3, the UCI president was a member of the Cycling Anti-Doping
Foundation (cADF) board. under cookson, the CADF became a separate legal
entity, completely independent of the ucl. Furthermore, Legal Anti-Doping
Services (LADS) was created, overseen by an external lawyer (CADI, 201 8).
ln 2014 and 2015, the cycling lndependent Reform committee, an independent
entity, conducted ,,a wide-ranging independent investigation into the causes
of thl pattern of doping that developed within cycling and allegations which
implicate the ucl and other governing bodies and officials over ineffective
investigation of such doping practices" (Rebeggiani, 201 6)'
state-of-tÀe-art confidential reporting mechanisms were created for
whistle-blowers.
A Women's Commission was established.
Ëvery commission/committee must have at least one female member (although
this is not yet formalised in the Constitution)'
All ucl worldchampionships offered equal prize money for men and women by
2016 (Clarke, 201 6).
a staffmember, this has left Lappartient in the comfortable position of being able to focus on
sporting projects, such as the reform of theWorldTour, whi.ch features cycling's most pres-
tigioLls cycling races (e.g.,Tour de France, Giro d'Italia,Vuelta a Espaiia). Lappartient's impact
iriterms of sùplng anJ improving the UCI's governance will have to be measçred against
the promises he set out in his election manifesto in which he emphasised his commitrnent to
improving the goverirance of cycling, notably with regard to technological fraucl, doping and
pot.otialLa.ripulation through betting. Since his election, Lappartient's manifesto has been
àeveiopecl inro â strategic vision known as UCI Agenda 2022 (UCI,2018c), bringing to
mind Àe IOC'sAgendiZOZO.In the UCIAgenda 2022,Lappartient reiterâtes the neecl for
,,real and effective leadership" (p.6), reaffirms the role of the president ancl stresses rebuild-
ing the "badly clamaged relationship" (p. 7) between the president and the Management
CJmmittee. The principles of moclern governance will be further improved in the follow-
ing areas: 1) The processes of managing solidariry funds and the tansp.arency of allocations
to stakeholders, 2) regular auclits by independent exlernal entities and gender parity at all
levels. Greater transpârency on allocations and working towards gender pariry seem to be
direct responses to the weaknesses in the UCI's governance revealed by the ASOIF govern-
ance reviews. Some aspects that may require further improvement are listed below by GTF
dimension (see Table 13.2)'
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Table 13,2 Possible future improvements to the UCI's governance
Democracy
Transparency
lntegrity
Checks ôr balances/
control mechanisms
A term limit was introduced for the president in 2016, but not for members
of the Management Committee or Commissions3.
No independent reporting mechanisms exist regarding the allocation of
resources for development.
The UCI performs poorly at decision-making level in terms of gender
balance (1 1olo female board members in May 201 B). On a more positive
note, the UCI is seeking to implement equal pay at the administrative
level.
An lnternal Audit Committee was established under Cookson, fulfilling
a strategic promise (the consolidated financial statements of the UCI
were audited by KPMC). However, since the UCI replaced the financial
consultant with a full-time chief financial officer under LappartienL the
lnternal Audit Committee is not independent of the UCI administration.
The announcement by broadcast giant Sky in December 2018 that it wouid end its spon-
sorslrip deal with Team Sky, worth {30 miilion a year, after the 2019 season brought another
recurring issue to the fore; namely, the ûnancial precariousness of the economic moclel of
cycling in general, and proGssional road cycling teams and riders in particular, given the con-
siderable dependence on sponsor investment (Pavitt,201B).Verbruggen had already tried to
tackle the issue of teams'vr-rlnerability by creating the ProTour/WoridTour in 2005.The objec-
tive of the UCl*ownerl circuit was to stabilise the teams' ûnancial situation by guaranteeing
top-level participation. "W'e wanted to open new sources of revenues for the teams and bind
sponsors via participation guarântees" (HeinVerbruggen,April 2015), However, cycling's eco-
nomic nrodel continues to be fragile and many professional road cycling teams disband orce the
main sponsor leaves. Probably the most dangerous downside of this situation is the professional
instability for riders.and the increased risk of them using prohibited substances to improve their
results to secure a contract (Aubel & Ohl,2015; Ohl, Fincoeur, Lentillon-Kaesrner, Defrance
& Brissonneau,2015).If teams rely almost entireiy on their main sponsors this is also because
there is no redistribution ofTV rights to them.The withdrawal of Sky as the sponsor of the
team that has dom-inated road cycling over recent years shows that "no team is immune fronr
potential difficulties under the current model" (Pavitt,2018).The issue of rhe precariousness
of cycling's economic model needs to be addressed in future reforms of the UCI, especialiy as
event organisers artd teâms are seeking more involvement.WhileVerbruggen's presidency was
very autocratic and built around his personality, Lappartient has to involve cycling's main stake-
holders in decision-making.
The example of the UCI illustrates the importance of the president's leadership in the gov-
ernance of an IF It also shows the power of the national federations that elect (or sonretimes do
not re-elect) the president and that must vote on significant reforms of governance while being
beneficiaries, or not, ofa redistribution ofIF resources.
Two underestimated key factors of lF governance
According to Henry and Lee (2004), three dimensions of governânce that have an impact on
the operation oforganisations can be distinguished; these specificaiiy apply in the case oflFs and
shine a light on the levels ofre{iection and action and associated key factors.These three dinren-
sions are the organisational, political and systendc dimensions. The organisational (corporate)
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dimension concerns the exercise of the porver of management and control within IFs, in other
words the decision-making processes and the concluct of strategy in order to improve the per-
formance of the organisation and the achievement of its objectives.
The political dimension concerns the relationship that IFs maintain in the politicai field. It
reporrs on the manner in wldch political institutions (states, European union, United Nations,
etc.) seek to influence, or indeed regulate, international sport by means of the mobilisation of
rrgulatory ûnancial and moral nr.echanisms or by various political influences.The question of
power is no longer analysed in its intra-organisational dimension but rather in its inter-organisa-
tional dimension.This political governance is less significant for IFs than fot national federations,
which generally maintain strong partnership relationships with their rninistries of sport.
The systemic climension aims to describe situations ofinterdependence and the fotms ofreg-
uiation of inter-organisational relations as well as the coordinatian of aciions within a complex
system such as the toral Olympic system (Chappelet,2016b).The concept of the complexity of
the sporting and Olympic system refers to the uncettainty of the environment, the wide range
of stakeholders 
- 
often with differing interesls (public, conrmuniry conrrnercial) - and the mul-
tipliciry of levels of coordination (from local to global), [n dynamic terms, the notion of systemic
governânce marks the transition from a reguiation/coordination of actions that is centralised,
hierarchical and vertical (government) to a horizontal regulation,/coordinatiqn in terms of net-
wori<s based on consensus/compronrise ancl power shared with several actors (governance),This
11ew rype of regulation is well expressed in the implementation of public-private partnerships,
as demonstrated by the regulation ofthe g1oba1 ûght against doping through the operations of
the World Anti-Doping Agency (Chappelet & van Luijk, 20 1 8).
These three leveis of governânce are complementary, interrelated and must be iritegratecl
and implemented in rhe governance o{ an IF in orcler to improve their efficacy and legiti-
macy.There seern to be two key points.The ûrst point relates to the exercise of power and
leaclership in the IFs and at the administrative heâdquarters.This concerns a good definition
within the IFs, going beyond statutory formalisrn, of questions such as: Who decicles?'Who
implements? Who checks ancl reports on the results ancl to whon? In this respect, it is neces-
sâry to analyse the roles of the president, the director general, the Boarci of Directors (BoD)
and the general assembly (GA).There are four main types of con{iguration of power in IFs,
narnely 1) a strong presidency (an execurtive president generally reiying on two key employees,
the adnrinistrative/financial director and the sports director,in order to lead the federation);
2) a dispersed presidency (a powerful executive president surroundecl by five or six main key
actors, whether paicl or not); 3) a tandem presidency (also termecl the president / djrector tan-
dem); and 4) managerial power (managerial and political power to a paid CEO) over elected
ofûcials (Bayle & Robinson,2007).
Four cases of IFs (UCI, FIFA, FISA, International Hockey Federation [FIH]) of different sizes
and levels ofprofessionalisation serve to illustrate these power contgurations,As seen above, the
UCI has traditionally had a strong presidency (type 1) (followed by managerial power around
the CEO and a reluctant board during the Cookson presidency - type 4),FIFA is a dispersed
presidency (typ"2) that hac{ autocratic leadership by the president during the Blatter era.This
situation recurred after Infantino's election despite governânce reforms and the reinforcetnent
of the secretary general's position to oversee the administrative headquarters (the FIFA Board is
more dedicated to ensuring political equilibrium between representatives of continental con-
federations). FISA has a tradition of a presiclent with a strong rowing background (obligatory
in the constiturion) and has achieved greâter professionalisation through a tandem presidency
(typ" 3) of the preside nt/ director general. FIH built a managerial model around a strong CEO
between 2070 and 2015 (tyPe a).
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In reaiiry the doctrine by which electeci oftcials (boa.d) decide, employees (the IF's secre-
tariat or administration) irnplement and the GA monitors is often poorly observed. Presidents
are increasingly executive or compensated presi.dents and other elected ofâcials are less prorni-
nent ât the headquarters; boards ôf directors rarely play ân executive role and act às a genuine
counterweight to presidential power, Furthermore, the GA monitors the results obtained in a
rather distant and very formal manner.Whiie IF reporting methods are evolving and becoming
more professional (with the enrergence of more detailed financial and activity reports rilat âre
publicly accessible on the Internet), checks of performance neasurements and countervailing
powers are stili weak (states, the nr.edia and NGOs have little influence in regulating âny excesses
of governance).
The IOC has a significant right of scrutiny as a result of the redistribution of a part of the
broadcasting and marketing rights for the Olympic Games to IFs (viaASOIF).The magnitude
of this has increased substantially since 2012 (approximately USD$600 million over four years
slrared between the 28 Sun-imer Olympic IFs for 2013-2016) and one of the evaluation criteria
for sport to remain on the olympic programrne is IF governance (IoC,2012). However, the
effectiveness of this evaluation can be queried.After the Rio Games, the largest sum was allo-
catecl to the IAAFa despite the 2015 governance scandal involving its ôrmer president. Changes
in systemic governânce also sometimes imply consequences for organisational governance, as
illustrated by the advent ofdirectorships on the BoD reserved for stakehoiders (athletes, o{ficials,
representatives of the professional sport, doctors and women) atd/or qualified or independent
individuals. Irrdependent ethics committees (e.g., for the UCI) andlor governance conrmirees
(for FIFA) irave also been established with the aspiration of ensuring better governance.
The second key point ôr the governânce of IFs concerns the support ofcontinental and
nationâl structures and, more broadly, the improvement of the federal newvork. In other words,
the governance ofthe federal pyramid and the quaiity ofcollaboration between the five levels of
intervention (international, continental, nâtional, regional and local) are important to create the
optinâl conditions for the organisation and development of the sport. Mrkonjict work (2015)
on European federations shows that three moclels of continental IF organisation can be distin-
guished.The ûrst is the legal (and sometimes political, although rarely economic) autonomy of
continentâl confederdtions with a European federation that is often stlonger than the others (a
ciear exarnple is the case of the European Footbâll Confederation (IJEFA).This model is very
rare; contineutal confederations are generally weak and their connections are sometimes ineÊ
fective in the implementation of IF development policies.Two other organisationa-l models exist,
namely a) the very common institutional absence of continentai confederations (e.g., FISA) and
b) the unique case, potentially offering inspiration for the future, ofthe creation ofcontinental
ofûces under the control of thé international headquârters in iine with rhe one FIBA strategy
(FIBA Europe, FIBdAmericas, etc.).
IFs that are seeking to give impetus to their federal network of national federations have a
range ofchoices and resources depending on whether or not they can fund the development
ând structuring ofthe network. FIFA has connections through its six confederations and offers
strong support to national Gderations with overail annual contributions both to operâtiorls
and in accordance with national federation projects. Each national federation has the sane
in{luence as the GA (one-country-one-vote system).The FIH instead relies on a coilabora-
tion with its strongest national federations (England, the Netherlands, India, etc.) and through
knowiedge-sharing with others. The UCI tries to support its national federations through a
knowledge-sharing platform for each continent. FISA is nore focused on institutional and sport
relationships with its national federations.
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The managenrent of the organisational governànce of the adniinistrative headquarters and
the federal netr,vork is a chalJnge due tolhe very stfong heterogeneity of continental and
natioûal $tructures in terms of prJfessionalisation. Systemic goverflance nltlst therefol'e be nr'ore
srrongly inregrated into the ,efle.tiorrs of IFs in the future through the relationships that they
must form with the loc, other IFs, states (often co-organising their events), intergovernmental
organisations (EU, uN), privor" prrrrr.r*, rhe media, NGos ancl even civil society'This increased
."-ùf.-r' ,"qoir", highllevel oiganisational govetnance, bringing togethet professionalisrn and
,.rpà*riu".r.rs while preserving i.*o.r.ti. principles (e{ûcacy and democracy car sometimes
npi"n, ,o be contradiitory).The qualities of ieaders (skills, manageriai expertise, sgategic vision'
irruolu"rrr.rrt, values) ancl, more speciûcally, of IF presidents, afe put direcdy to the test on this
subject' 
r1,'l he nnted thnt tire accr to power is not onlyin this respect, it shoulcl be ot  t at c ession ofan IF president
achieved through profèssionai skills but also,and especially,by a political capacity to achieve and
rerain power. iî. *.4, anci soft power platforms thât international sport ancl the Olyinpic
Games offer explain why countrie, Ito.it as Russia, the Gulf states, china, united States' etc')
are developing genuine strategies to encoûr'âge their citizens to âttâin these presidential func-
tions. However, despite 
"u"ryiri.,.g, 
these positions are overwhelmingly occupied by men from
'Western EuroPe.
Conclusion
This chapter summarises the efforts made by the IFs of sports of the summer and winter
olympic programmes to achieve better govefnance under the auspices of a system of indicators
drawn up byASOIF rn2075 at the IocI rêquest. In particular,it focuses on the case of the
UCI, which governs cyciing and has hacl a series of four presidents since the turn of the century'
These presidents have initilted, ancl then confronted, major govertance reforms that have not
yet been ful1y accomplisheci.The chapter then emphasises two impottant {âctors for improved
IF governance. Firstly, it is essential for the organisational and political €fovefnance ofan IF for
the elected presiclent to demonstrate leadership, in particular for the day-to*day operation ofits
administrative headquarrers.Thisleadership is also key to the chemistry of the duo forrnedby
the president and the IF',s number two, whelher he or she is known as the director or secretary
(generai or executive) or chief executive o{âcer (CËO) and whether electecl or appointed' with
a"great", or lesser degSree ofautonorny. Secondly, the goverrrance ofthe n:twolk ofnational ancl
continental federations and, more broadly speaking, stakehoiders, is crucial to the governance 
of
the IF and the systenric governance oflhe ecosystem ofits sport through the redistribution of
sometimes signiûcant ,.r-orrr.., ancl the democratic principle that almost always gives one vote
to each menrber-national federation of the IF. Future research should be carried out examining
the ieadership sryles and national networks of IFs as they can both impact negativeiy the overall
governance ofan If and can destroy the best efforts towards better govefnance at the interna-:
tional level through scandals linked to a person or a country at a iocal 1evel'To what extent' for
example, can an IF impose it, gov"r.trnÀ standârds on its national sport federations or push its
national leaders towards improved governance?
Many IFs are over 100 years où and operâte with substantiai budgets' However' there are
oo* **rry new players interested in sport that want to take advantage of its beneûts'These are'
of courseiprimarily athletes of the sport in question.There are also commercial players such as
sponsors, broacicasters and professional leagu'es, as well as public actors, such as local or national
jovernments, becoming increasingly involved in the organisation of sporting events and the
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fight against the scourges afflicting sport; or, quite simply, they are seeking to get their popuia_
tions moving to enjoy the benetts of movenent through sport.Tire brric, of tlr. go,r"rrirrr..
of IFs dates back to the foundation of many of th.se federations in the early 20th century.
Governance practises must now adapt to the current situation in which commercialisation andproGssionalisation of the IFs demand a more trânsparent culture.
Notes
1 Amaury Sport organisation (ASO) is the company that organises the Tour de France, the vueita aEspafra'Paris-Nice,as well as other mQjor cycling races and spoldng events 1e.g., na6r,la.is Marathon),totalling 75 evenrs in 25 countries in 201g qasofr, ZO1S;. - -2 The201L6 UCI Roadworid Championships in Qatar (awarded during the presidency ofpat Mceraid)
was an example of a contrary approach; the event was awarded to qa-tar as-the highest bidder.3 According to a staû'member, tertll linrits for members of the Managen"or conrrnin.. wer-e rejectedin2016.
4 FINA (swnnming) and FIG (gymnastics) receive the sane âmount æ trre IAAE
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Irange of rssues shaprng sporT governance. lt considers the evolution of the sport rndustry
m a largely arnateur. volunteer-drrven sector rnto the globalrs:d tusrness that rt is today and
mrncs how professionalrsatron has fundamentally shrfted the governance landscape for sport
anrsatrons and all those rrvorkrng ',,rrrthrn soort.
ttten by a tearn of ieadtng sport .nanagement scholars from around the wcrld, the book rs
anrsed around frve key themes
Part l: Ovenrrerry of soort governance
Part ll. Envrronrnenta.l context and polrcy perspectrves
Part lll: Ournershtp stn-rciures and governance models lmplicatrons for sport governance
Part IV: Board roles rn the go'ler-nance process
Part V: Fuiure sport governante challenges
ach chapter revrews the mo3I rec-.nt research avarlable and, rr s.orne cases, presents neiry data
support previously publrslred stuCres As sport governance is a relat,vely young freld,
h chapter maps future research neecis io provide direction for sport governance scholars. A
I feature of the irandbook rs a series of nrne shcrter research chapters in Part lV examining
roles tn the gor,rernance proce3s. tyrng theory to the day-to-ciay practrcal aspects of runrrlt-lt
sporl organrsatron
her
broader and deeper coverage of the key rssues tn conterrporary sport governance than any
book, thts handb,ook rs essentral reading for students, res.earchers and practrtioners tî
busrness and management.rt 1
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